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Abstract
This article discusses whether EU economic law precludes national prohibitions of sales below 
cost. Following an overview of the 1993 Keck and Mithouard judgment and the 2001 and 2002 
Proposals for a Sales Promotions Regulation, the article will highlight the pre-emptive effect of 
the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29 on national prohibitions of sales below 
cost. In addition, the so-called ‘convergence rule’ of the 2003 Antitrust Regulation 1/2003, which 
inter alia does not apply to national prohibitions of sales below cost, will be discussed. Finally, 
this article will open up new avenues for further research on whether EU economic law should 
preclude national prohibitions of sales below cost.
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1 Setting the Scene: Does EU Economic Law Preclude National 
Prohibitions of Sales Below Cost?
National Prohibitions of Sales Below Cost
In some Member States, sales below costs are prohibited. These national prohibitions 
aim to establish a certain threshold price under which undertakings are not allowed to 
sell except in a limited set of circumstances. However, the nature and scope of these 
national prohibitions vary widely (e.g. application of the prohibition to all retail sectors 
or only to certain firms or products; circumstances under which a sale below cost 
would be allowed even if the practice is generally prohibited; elements included in the 
calculation of ‘costs’, etc.).
 In France, for example, Article L. 420-5 of the Commercial Code prohibits abusively 
low pricing as an ‘anticompetitive practice’, where the object or effect of such offers or 
practices is to exclude an undertaking from the market. The conditions of application 
of this prohibition are similar to those concerning predatory pricing (cost test), but its 
scope is limited to sales to final consumers, and it does not require proof of a dominant 
position. In addition, Article L. 442-2 of the Commercial Code, as amended by the 
2008 Loi Chatel, prohibits resale below cost as a ‘practice restricting competition’. The 
threshold was lowered in 2008 in order to allow deeper discounting by resellers without 
breaching Article L. 420-5 (abusively low pricing).1 In Belgium, Article 101 of the 2010 
Market Practices and Consumer Protection Act contains a per se prohibition of sales 
below cost (retaking ex Article 41 of the 1991 Commercial Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act). Likewise, Spain and Portugal have certain unfair trade rules prohibiting 
sales below cost. 
 However, several Member States, including Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom, 
have removed their rules concerning resale below cost in recent years.
* Assistant Professor HUB, senior affiliated researcher KU Leuven. 
1 The Attali report called for the removal of the prohibition of resale at loss (as amended by the 1996 
‘Loi Galland’). See Rapport de la Commission pour la libération de la croissance française, sous la 
présidence de Jacques Attali, 23 January 2008, available at <http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/
BRP/084000041/0000.pdf>
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Outline 
The purpose of this article is to discuss whether EU economic law precludes national 
prohibitions of sales below cost. In the first section, the focus will be on the negative 
answer given by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Keck and Mithouard 
judgment and on the answers of the European Commission in the Proposals for a 
Sales Promotions Regulation. In the second section, attention will be paid to the pre-
emptive effect of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29 on national per 
se prohibitions of sales below cost, where they pursue objectives related to consumer 
protection. In addition, the exclusion of national prohibitions of sales below cost from 
the so-called ‘convergence rule’ of the Antitrust Regulation 1/2003 will be discussed. 
Finally, this article will open up new avenues for further research on whether EU 
economic law should preclude national prohibitions of sales below cost. In any case, 
there is an urgent need for the Union to take an unequivocal position on this matter.
2 The Past Answers: No and Yes, Then No
2.1 Keck and Mithouard: No
Introduction
It is well known that the ECJ ruled in Oosthoek that
legislation which restricts or prohibits certain forms of advertising and 
certain means of sales promotion may, although it does not directly affect 
imports, be such as to restrict their volume because it affects marketing 
opportunities for the imported products. The possibility cannot be ruled 
out that to compel a producer either to adopt advertising or sales promotion 
schemes which differ from one Member State to another or to discontinue 
a scheme which he considers to be particularly effective may constitute an 
obstacle to imports even if the legislation in question applies to domestic 
products and imported products without distinction.2
The Oosthoek criterion led to a flood of litigation where traders invoked the illegality 
of any (unfair) trade rules even where such rules did not have any greater impact on 
imported than on domestic products and merely reduced the overall volume of sales. 
This led to the possible subjection of any (unfair) trade rules to supervision under EU 
law and started to damage the image and legitimacy of the ECJ. Moreover, the ECJ’s 
approach was not always consistent and when dealing with national rules restricting 
the circumstances in which goods may be marketed, Article 34 TFEU was sometimes 
interpreted narrowly, other times broadly.3
Keck and Mithouard 
In Keck and Mithouard, the ECJ considered it necessary, in view of ‘the increasing 
tendency of traders to invoke [Article 34 TFEU] as a means of challenging any rules 
whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed 
at products from other Member States’, to ‘re-examine and clarify its case-law on this 
matter’.4 In this case, the ECJ examined the compatibility with Article 34 TFEU of the 
French general prohibition on resale below cost. Mister Keck and Mister Mithouard, 
managers of two French supermarkets in Mundolsheim (close to the German border), 
2 Case C-286/81, Criminal proceeding against Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV, [1982] ECR 
I-4575, para. 15. 
3 See, with regard to this pre-Keck case law and different possible tests for Article 34 TFEU, W. Wils, ‘The 
Search for the Rule in Article 30 EEC: Much Ado about Nothing?’, 18 European Law Review 475 (1993).
4 Case C-286/81, Criminal proceeding against Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV, [1982] ECR 
I-4575, para. 14.
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were prosecuted in criminal proceedings for reselling beer and coffee in an unaltered 
state to consumers, at prices lower than their actual purchase price. Advocate General 
van Gerven presented two opinions with opposite results.5 The ECJ first observed that 
a general prohibition on resale below cost is not designed to regulate trade in goods 
between the Member States, but may, admittedly, be considered as ‘legislation which 
restricts certain means of sales promotion and which restricts their volume’ (Oosthoek). 
But the question remained whether such a possibility was sufficient to characterise the 
French prohibition in question as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction.6 The ECJ argued that
in the absence of harmonisation of legislation, obstacles to free movement 
of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from 
other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, 
rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those 
relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, 
labelling, packaging) constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited 
by Article [34]. This is so even if those rules apply without distinction to 
all products unless their application can be justified by a public-interest 
objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods.7
 By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the application 
to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or 
prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the 
meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long as those provisions apply 
to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long 
as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of 
domestic products and of those from other Member States.8
The Keck proviso is actually a double discrimination test. Rules concerning selling 
arrangements are excluded so long as they are not discriminatory with regard to their 
application and with regard to their legal or factual effect. The ECJ indicated that the 
basic idea underlying the discrimination test is that of equal market access:
Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to 
the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements 
laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to 
5 See Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven of 18 November 1992 (before the 2nd Chamber), Joined 
Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceeding against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, [1993] 
ECR I-6097, stating that the French prohibition was basically suitable to ensure fair trading and consumer 
protection (para. 8) but did not satisfy the proportionality test (para. 9): ‘The problem with a ban framed in 
general terms … is, however, that use of the sales promotion method which it prohibits is also banned in 
trading situations which cannot be regarded as unfair, anti-competitive or detrimental to the consumer. … 
In so far as it also covers those situations, a prohibition of sale at a loss framed in general terms therefore 
goes further than is necessary to achieve the aims allowed by Community law.’
 See Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven of 28 April 1993 (before the full Court, to which the case 
was referred due to its importance), Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceeding against 
Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097, focusing on the question whether the French 
prohibition worked as an obstacle to intra-Union trade in the specific factual setting before the national 
court. He concluded (para. 13) that ‘a statutory prohibition of resale at a loss is not incompatible with Article 
[34] of the EEC Treaty since it appears that the events at issue in the main proceedings occurred at the retail 
level, that is to say at a level in respect of which a recognised ground of justification may be invoked for the 
rules in question and that at that level there is no more than a purely hypothetical effect on trade between 
Member States and certainly no more than an hypothetical hindering of trade flows’. However, he added 
(para. 14) that ‘that is not to say … that France would not do well to amend its legislation to bring it more 
into conformity with Community law’.
6 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceeding against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097, para. 12-13. 
7 Id., para. 15.
8 Id., para. 16. 
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the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of 
domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 
[34] of the Treaty.9
Whereas Advocate General van Gerven in his two Opinions argued that the French 
prohibition of resale at a loss could, in some cases, impede access to the French market 
of imported products more than access of domestic products, the ECJ simply held that 
Article 34 TFEU ‘is to be interpreted as not applying to legislation of a Member State 
imposing a general prohibition of resale at a loss’.10
 According to the ECJ, national requirements relating to ‘selling arrangements’, 
such as sales below cost, are by nature, as far as imported products are concerned, 
not ‘such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access more than they 
impede the access of domestic products’. They do not normally mean that (the intrinsic 
or extrinsic characteristics of) imported products must be adapted in order to satisfy the 
requirements of Member States of destination. Hence, the producer/supplier faces no 
(significant) additional costs, which would have the effect of impeding the imported 
product’s access to the market or even, where those costs are prohibitive, of making 
access impossible.11
 According to the ECJ, product requirements are by nature, as far as imported products 
are concerned, ‘such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access more 
than they impede the access of domestic products’. They mean that imported products 
lawfully manufactured and marketed in the Member State of origin must be adapted in 
order to suit the product requirements of the Member States of destination and must, 
as a result, satisfy the requirements of two different sets of legislation (contrary to the 
Cassis de Dijon principle of mutual recognition). 
 In opting for an overall assessment, the ECJ diverged from the Cassis de Dijon 
test. Indeed, at least as regards ‘national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain 
sales arrangements’, the ECJ no longer presumes that every national rule ‘capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-[Union] trade’ falls within 
the scope of Article 34 TFEU.12
Conclusion 
The answer of Keck and Mithouard is no; EU law does not preclude national prohibitions 
of sales below cost, as long as they are not discriminatory with regard to their application 
and their legal or factual effect.13
2.2 The Proposals for a Sales Promotions Regulation: Yes, Then No
Introduction 
As from the late 1990s, the Commission initiated legislative proceedings which were 
meant to lead to the adoption of a so-called Sales Promotions Regulation.
9 Id., para. 17.
10 Id., para. 18.
11 Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven of 16 March 1994, Joined Cases C-401/92 and C-402/92, 
Criminal proceedings against Tankstation ‘t Heukske vof and J.B.E. Boermans, [1994] ECR I-2199, 
para. 20.
12 Id., para. 24.
13 The ECJ confirmed the Keck judgment on the French prohibition of sales below cost in relation to 
the Belgian prohibition of sales yielding only a very low profit margin. See Case C-63/94, Groupement 
national des négociants en pomme de terre de Belgique v ITM Belgium SA and Vocarex SA, [1995] ECR 
I-2476. This is also settled in Belgian case law: see e.g. President of the Antwerp Commercial Court 19 June 
2003, Jb. Hand. Med. at 380 (2003).
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Original commission proposal
In 2001, the Commission adopted a first Proposal for a Regulation on Sales Promotions 
in the Internal Market (‘Original SP Proposal’).14 According to the Commission, the 
outcome of the assessment of the internal market barriers resulting from significant 
differences in national rules concerning commercial communications indicated that 
three types of provisions had to be established at the European level in order to remove 
these barriers: maximum harmonisation of certain (transparency) provisions concerning 
the use and commercial communication of sales promotions, abolishment of certain 
restrictions, and application of mutual recognition. The Commission was not in favour 
of a harmonised European ban on ‘sales below cost’ (defined as ‘discounts consisting 
of a sale of a product or service by a retailer below the retailer’s net invoice price 
inclusive of carriage, insurance and other delivery costs as well as tax’).15 According to 
the Commission, the proportionality analysis suggested that the objective of preventing 
market destabilization, abuse of dominance and consumer deception could be realised 
by less restrictive measures such as harmonised transparency provisions. The protection 
against unfair competition and consumer protection could be achieved in a more 
effective and proportionate manner through specific information requirements than 
through prohibitions of sales below cost, which are in addition difficult to enforce.
 The Commission proposed that suppliers would have to be informed ex-ante by 
their resellers, in conformity with contractual terms, of the possibility that their goods 
or services are to be resold at a loss. By being informed in this way, suppliers who 
are concerned that such operations could undermine their brand equity or give the 
impression that their products or services are of inferior quality would be able to set 
conditions in their initial supply contracts to prevent such outcomes or simply to refuse 
to enter into contract with the relevant resellers. In this way, economic detriment to 
small competitors of large retailers, who have sufficient lines of products to cross-
subsidise such sales systematically, would also be avoided, as the large retailers would 
no longer be able to abuse their dominant positions in the retail market and drive out 
smaller competitors through such campaigns.
 The Commission proposed that customers would have to be made aware of the real 
value of the good or service in order to ensure that they would be able to properly 
compare the real economic value of competing goods and services. Promoters would 
have to indicate in the relevant commercial communication whether a sale represents 
a sale below cost. This would ensure that consumers understand that the economic 
value of the product or service is greater than the discounted price that they are being 
offered to purchase it. Moreover, this transparent presentation of below cost sales would 
facilitate the application of competition policy rules against predatory pricing in that it 
would be easier to detect systematic operations of this type that could reflect the abuse 
of a dominant position by a reseller. 
Conclusion 
The answer of the SP Regulation, should the Original SP Regulation have been passed, 
would have been yes; EU law precludes national prohibitions of sales below cost.
14 Original Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on Sales Promotions 
in the Internal Market, 2 October 2001, COM (2001) 546 final.
15 Article 2. See also Explanatory Memorandum: ‘This definition is based on existing national definitions 
and is also consistent with jurisprudence of the Court in the field of competition rules (predatory pricing). 
A sales below cost is defined as a sale where the price at which the product or service is sold is lower than 
the net invoice price at which that retailer or wholesaler purchased the product or service from the relevant 
supplier. The net invoice price is the unit price on the invoice from the supplier or the wholesaler to the 
promoter including carriage, insurance or other costs and value added tax. The invoice and other costs used 
for the calculation should be dated the same day of the sales promotion or its commercial communication. 
Where no such invoice exists, the net invoice price should be based on the most recent invoice supplied to 
that promoter for such goods or services that are subject to the sales promotion’.
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Amended Commission proposal 
In 2002, the Commission adopted an Amended Proposal for a Sales Promotions 
Regulation. The Commission accepted a number of European Parliament amendments 
which would contribute to ‘a constructive compromise on the treatment of sales below 
costs’.16 Basically, the EP wanted the Regulation to be ‘without prejudice to national 
provisions governing sales or resales below cost’, that is, ‘without prejudice to the 
possibility for Member States or regulatory bodies to adopt specific measures which, 
in the interests of protecting consumers, supplier companies and competition, partially 
restrict the use and commercial communication of particular sales promotions such as 
sales below cost’.17 The Commission took over this amendment in Article 3(3) of the 
Amended Proposal, according to which the Regulation would be ‘without prejudice 
to national provisions governing sales or resales below cost’. This meant that national 
legislators would remain free to introduce or maintain prohibitions of sales below cost.
Conclusion
The answer of the SP Regulation, should the Amended SP Regulation have been passed, 
would have been no; EU law does not preclude national prohibitions of sales below 
cost. Interestingly, the revision clause of Article 7 provided that the comprehensive 
report on the application of the Regulation and of the impact of sales promotions law on 
both consumers and business would also have to contain ‘a detailed evaluation of the 
Internal Market effects on the differing national prohibitions on sales below cost and an 
assessment of the impact of a potential liberalisation of such sales’.
Repeal in 2006 of the Amended Commission Proposal for a Sales Promotions 
Regulation
Ultimately, however, the legislative work on the Amended Commission Proposal 
was slowed down and finally stopped, awaiting the outcome of the work on the 
2003 Commission Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices.18 The Amended Commission Proposal for a Sales Promotions 
Regulation was withdrawn in 2006.
16 Amended Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Sales Promotions in the Internal Market, 25 
October 2002, COM (2002) 585 final.
17 European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 September 2002 on the proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council regulation on sales promotions in the Internal Market, A5-0253/2002, P5_
TA(2002)0400, amendments 28 and 32, with the following justifications: ‘In the report accompanying its 
proposal for a regulation the Commission confirms that sales below cost are legitimate. The legitimacy 
of sales promotions of this kind is not in question, but we feel that, in addition to specific conditions on 
transparency (requirement that the organisers of the promotion state clearly that the offer of a product or 
a service with a major reduction represents a sale below cost) to protect the consumer or the company 
supplying the products or services, consideration should be given to a further and no less damaging 
aspect of sales below cost, namely that they distort the conditions of competition to the detriment of other 
commercial companies, particularly small ones, as well as consumers. It is therefore proposed to amend 
the provisions of Article 3(2), first indent, of the proposal for a regulation, preventing Member States from 
imposing a general prohibition on the use or commercial communication of sales promotions, so that rules 
can be adopted at national level to regulate sales below cost in order to safeguard competition and protect 
supplier companies and consumers. … Sales below cost should not be governed by Community law, but 
by national law in accordance with local circumstances. The subsidiarity principle should apply here’. See 
also Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market of 10 July 2002 on the proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Regulation concerning sales promotions in the Internal Market – 
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, A5-0253/2002, PE 312.784.
18 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair 
‘business-to-consumer’ commercial practices in the Internal Market and amending directives 84/450/EEC, 
97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), 18 June 2003, COM (2003) 356 final.
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3 The Present Answers: Yes, Insofar as … and No
3.1 Directive 2005/29/EC: Yes, Insofar as the National Prohibition Pursues 
Objectives Related to Consumer Protection
Introduction
In 2005, the European legislator adopted Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices (hereafter ‘UCP Directive’).19 This 
Directive establishes a single regulatory framework concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices and is based on maximum harmonization.20 Does the 
UCP Directive have any (deregulatory) impact on national prohibitions of sales below 
cost? Following established ECJ case law on the Directive’s pre-emptive impact (e.g. on 
the Belgian prohibition of discounts preceding seasonal sales), the following step-by-
step analysis will lead to a conditional positive answer. On 19 July 2012, the commercial 
court of Gent (Belgium) lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in the Euronics 
Belgium case in relation to the compatibility of the Belgian prohibition of sales below 
cost with the UCP Directive.21 It will be argued in the following paragraphs that the 
Directive must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a national prohibition of sales 
below cost such as Article 101 of the Market Practices and Consumer Protection Act. 
Step 1 – Do sales below cost constitute B2C ‘commercial practices’  
The first thing to assess is of course whether sales below cost constitute ‘commercial 
practices’ within the meaning Article 2(d) UCP Directive. It is well known that the 
Directive gives a particularly wide definition to the concept of ‘business-to-consumer 
commercial practices’: ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, 
commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly 
connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’. It seems 
that Member States such as Belgium and France, while agreeing on the Directive and 
slowing down the project for a Sales Promotions Regulation, were or even still are not 
fully aware of the fact that both the use and the commercial communication of B2C 
sales promotions are clearly covered by the Directive.
 In the VTB-VAB proceedings concerning the compatibility of the Belgian prohibition 
of joined offers to consumers, the Belgian and French Governments basically developed 
two arguments for the opposite view. They argued, principally, that neither the use 
nor the commercial communication of B2C sales promotions constitute ‘commercial 
practices’ within the meaning of the UCP Directive as they were subject to the Amended 
Proposal for a Sales Promotions Regulation, and that the withdrawal of that Proposal 
(in 2006 only, one year after the adoption of the Directive) did not permit the inference 
that the Directive would now cover the use and commercial communication of B2C 
sales promotions previously covered by the Amended Proposal for a Sales Promotions 
Regulation. Belgium and France argued, in the alternative, that the use and commercial 
19 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/
EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2005 L 149.
20 The maximum harmonization character of the Directive has been confirmed in various ECJ judgments: 
Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma 
Magazines Belgium NV, [2009] ECR I-2949, paras. 51-52; Case C-304/08, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH, [2010] ECR I-217, para. 41; Case 
C-540/08, Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG v ‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag 
GmbH, (2010) ECR 2010, I-10909, para. 30; Case C-288/10, Wamo BVBA v JBC NV and Modemakers 
Fashion NV, nyr, para. 33.
21 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van Koophandel te Gent (Belgium) lodged on 
19 July 2012, Case C-343/12, Euronics Belgium CVBA v Kamera Express BV & Kamera Express Belgium 
BVBA.
260 Bert KeirsBilcK 
communication of B2C sales promotions only fall within the scope of application of the 
Directive, where, additionally, they are unfair within the meaning of its grand general 
clause.
 However, the Advocate General Trstenjak and the ECJ rightly rejected these two 
arguments in the following manner. First, it was argued that both the commercial 
communication and the use of B2C sales promotions constitute ‘commercial practices’ 
within the meaning of the Directive, as they ‘clearly form part of an operator’s commercial 
strategy and relate directly to the promotion thereof and its sales development’;22 by 
no later than the date of withdrawal of the Amended Proposal for a Sales Promotions 
Regulations (in 2006, at a time when the period for the transposition of the Directive was 
still running), the national legislators should have examined, if necessary, to what extent 
the scope of the Directive would also apply to fields previously covered by the Amended 
Proposal for a Sales Promotions Regulations. In my view, business-to-consumer sales 
below cost undeniably constitute ‘business-to-consumer commercial practices’ within 
the meaning of the Directive and the VTB-VAB judgment. Moreover, the fact that the 
Amended Proposal for a Sales Promotions Regulations is without prejudice to national 
prohibitions of sales below cost, is irrelevant, since it was repealed in 2006, well before 
the end of the transposition deadline of the Directive. Second, the argument that only 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices fall within the scope of application of 
the Directive was rightly disqualified in VTB-VAB as circular reasoning, stemming from 
an equation of the Directive’s scope of application with the conditions of application of 
its general clause.23
 It is worth noting that the Belgian legislator developed an additional argument for 
the view that the Belgian prohibition of B2C sales below cost falls outside the scope of 
the Directive. When transposing the Directive in 2007, the Belgian legislator argued, 
in the further alternative, that the Directive covers only commercial communications 
of sales below cost, not the use of sales below cost as such. The Directive was said to 
be without prejudice to national prohibitions on the use of sales below cost or to any 
‘fundamental requirements’ to be met by such sales, such as Article 41 of the 1991 
Commercial Practices and Consumer Protection Act. When drafting the new Market 
Practices and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, the Belgian legislator argued again that 
price setting below cost, as prohibited by Article 101 of that Act, is not a ‘commercial 
practice’ within the meaning of the Directive, on the ground that price setting as such, 
whether below cost or not, represents nothing but an internal business decision. The 
Belgian legislator seemed to argue that commercial communications (to the public) that 
prices of particular goods are below cost, constitute commercial practices, while sales 
below cost as such do not.24
 Yet, it is evident that the distinction between the prohibition of certain commercial 
communications on business practices on the one hand and the prohibition of the use of 
certain business practices, or the regulation of their ‘basic conditions’, is artificial and 
in line neither with the Directive nor with Belgian unfair trade law itself. As mentioned, 
the Directive’s definition of ‘commercial practices’ includes not only ‘commercial 
communication including advertising and marketing’ but also ‘any act, omission, 
course of conduct or representation, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, 
sale or supply of a product to consumers’. Similarly, the Commission Proposals for 
a Sales Promotions Regulation deliberately covered both the use and the commercial 
22 Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma 
Magazines Belgium NV, [2009] ECR I-2949, paras. 49-50; Case C-304/08, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH, [2010] ECR I-217, paras. 36-37; Case 
C-540/08, Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG v ‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag 
GmbH, [2010] ECR 2010, I-10909, paras. 17-18; Case C-288/10, Wamo BVBA v JBC NV and Modemakers 
Fashion NV, nyr, paras 30-31.
23 See B. Keirsbilck, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law 
(2011), at 231 et seq.
24 See H. De Bauw, ‘De gevolgen van het “koppelverkooparrest” van het Hof van Justitie van 23 april 
2009 voor de sperperiode en enkele andere regels’, 2008 Jaarboek Handelspraktijken en Mededinging 331 
at 347-348.
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communication of sales promotions, as use and communication cannot be isolated from 
each other. Likewise, Belgian unfair trade law traditionally simultaneously regulates the 
use and the commercial communication of ‘market practices’.
 Furthermore, the Belgian legislator argued that the Belgian prohibition of sales 
below cost must be considered as a national contract law rule, to which the Directive 
is, pursuant to Article 3(2), without prejudice.25 From this perspective, a retail price 
is primarily seen as the individually negotiated consideration for the transfer of the 
property of the good from the business to the consumer. Under this reading, the Belgian 
prohibition is seen as a contract law rule prohibiting the conclusion of below cost B2C 
sales contracts, and it is stressed that according to Belgian case law, infringements of that 
prohibition may result in the invalidity of the contract at issue. Hence, the prohibition is 
said to fall outside the scope of the Directive.
 However, retail prices (whether below cost or not) are very often not individually 
negotiated but rather offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Unfair trade law extensively 
regulates pricing practices, as they may have a substantial impact on the market by 
addressing or reaching a (large) number of consumers and influencing if not materially 
distorting their economic behaviour.26 The Belgian prohibition of B2C sales below cost 
has a similar collective dimension and prohibits the use and commercial communication 
of below cost pricing practices directly connected with the promotion of goods to 
consumers. In my view, the Belgian prohibition thus pertains to a commercial practice 
falling within the scope of the Directive. This conclusion cannot be called into question 
by the fact that infringements of that prohibition may result in the invalidity of the 
contract at issue. Article 3(2) of Directive 2005/29 must be interpreted as merely seeking 
to ensure that undesirable overlapping of the Directive and European or national contract 
law instruments does not occur at the level of legal consequences.27
 Hence, national prohibitions of sales below cost fall within the scope of the Directive, 
in so far as they apply to B2C relationships, and they fall outside the scope of the 
Directive, in so far as they apply to B2B relationships. 
Step 1bis – Do prohibitions of sales below cost pursue objectives related to 
consumer protection? 
Upon finding that a national measure concerns a ‘commercial practice’ within the 
meaning of the Directive, the next step is to determine whether that measure pursues 
objectives relating to consumer protection. A measure concerning a ‘commercial 
practice’ falls outside the scope of the Directive, if it does not pursue consumer protection 
objectives. It is settled case law since the ECJ judgments in Plus28 and Mediaprint29 and 
the ECJ orders in Wamo30 and Inno,31 that the statement in recitals 6 and 8 that the UCP 
Directive ‘neither covers nor affects the national laws on unfair commercial practices 
which harm only competitors’ economic interests’ should be interpreted as meaning that 
the Directive is without prejudice to any national measure concerning a ‘commercial 
practice’ that only has competitor protection objectives.32 A national measure regulating 
25 See also H. De Bauw, ‘De impact van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken op de regeling van de 
verkooppromoties onder de WHPC’, 2006 DCCR 3, at 19; De Bauw, above n. 24, at 347-348.
26 See also J. Glöckner, ‘The Scope of Application of the UCP Directive – I Know What You Did Last 
Summer’, 41 IIC 570, at 589 (2010), who regrets that the collective protective purpose of the Directive has 
not been adequately expressed in the definition of commercial practice. 
27 See Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Case C-453/10, Jana Pereničová, Vladislav Perenič v SOS 
financ spol. s r. o., nyr, paras. 89-90.
28 Case C-304/08, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft 
mbH, [2010] ECR I-217, paras. 38-39.
29 Case C-540/08, Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG v ‘Österreich’-
Zeitungsverlag GmbH, [2010] ECR 2010, I-10909, paras. 21-22.
30 Case C-288/10, Wamo BVBA v JBC NV and Modemakers Fashion NV, nyr, para. 20.
31 Case C-126/11, INNO NV v Unie van Zelfstandige Ondernemers VZW (UNIZO), Organisatie voor de 
Zelfstandige Modedetailhandel VZW (Mode Unie), Couture Albert BVBA, nyr, para. 22.
32 According to an alternative interpretation of recitals 6 and 8, the UCP Directive would neither cover 
nor affect national provisions regulating or prohibiting a commercial practice without actually having any 
consumer protection effect. See on this alternative interpretation in relation to the Belgian prohibition 
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or prohibiting a commercial practice with the dual aim of protecting competitors and 
consumers falls within the scope of the UCP Directive. This is also the view promoted 
by the Commission in its UCP Guidance.33 In order to establish whether a national 
provision (also) aims at protecting consumers, the general purpose of the law, the 
background and genesis of the measures in question, the preparatory works and academic 
comments should be taken into account.34 In the Wamo and Inno orders concerning the 
incompatibility of the Belgian prohibition of discounts preceding seasonal sales, the 
ECJ confirmed that the relevant question, upon finding that the national prohibition 
pertains to a ‘commercial practice’ within the meaning of the directive, is whether ‘the 
national provision … pursues objectives relating to consumer protection so that it comes 
within the scope of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’.35
 According to the European Commission, national prohibitions of selling below 
cost fall outside the scope of the UCP Directive, if the sole rationale is to ensure fair 
competition in the market space. Such national prohibitions fall within the scope of 
the Directive (and are precluded by that Directive), insofar as they pursue objectives 
relating to consumer protection (e.g. protection against bait practices).36
 In this respect, a close examination of the legislative proceedings leading to the 
adoption of the Belgian prohibition of sales below cost demonstrates that the prohibition 
of ex Article 41 Commercial Practices and Consumer Protection Act was introduced 
in order to protect both the economic interests of competitors and of consumers. 
Undoubtedly, the main objective was to protect small retailers against big chain stores, 
who have sufficient lines of products to cross-subsidize sales below cost systematically, 
and to ensure fair competition. However, the legislator also sought to protect consumers 
against businesses selling selected goods below cost, thereby attracting consumers 
who will make up for the losses on highlighted products with additional purchases of 
profitable goods.37 
 As mentioned, Article 101 of the 2010 Market Practices and Consumer Protection Act 
retakes Article 41 of the repealed 1991 Commercial Practices and Consumer Protection 
Act. Not unsurprisingly, the proponents of the Belgian prohibition of sales below cost 
may now argue that from 2010 the Belgian prohibition no longer seeks to protect the 
of discounts preceding seasonal sales B. Keirsbilck, ‘De invloed van het Europees recht op het Belgisch 
handelspraktijken- en belendende verbintenissenrecht’, in I. Samoy, E. Terryn and V. Sagaert (eds.), De 
invloed van het Europese recht op het Belgische privaatrecht (2012) 591; H. Dewulf, B. Keirsbilck and E. 
Terryn, ‘Overzicht van rechtspraak – Algemeen handelsrecht en handelspraktijken’, 48 TPR 921, at 1117-
1123 (2011). 
33 Commission Staff Working Document, Guidance on the implementation/application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, SEC(2009) 1666, 3 December 2009, 14: ‘National rules 
regulating commercial practices … for which the sole rationale is to ensure fair competition in the market 
space, do not fall within the scope of the Directive. … Where consumers’ and competitors’ interests coincide 
and national measures regulate a practice with the dual aim of protecting consumers and competitors, 
such national measures are covered by the Directive.’ See also D. Gol, ‘Des pratiques du commerce aux 
pratiques du marché: la loi du 6 avril 2010‘, in N. Thirion (ed.), Actualités en matière de pratiques du 
marché et protection du consommateur (2010) 53, at 98; E. Terryn, ‘Koppelverkoop en andere per se 
verboden in de Handelspraktijkenwet (toekomstige Wet Marktpraktijken en Consumentenbescherming) na 
het VTB-VAB-arrest van het Hof van Justitie’, 73 RW 1242, at 1249 (2010).
34 See Commission Staff Working Document, Guidance on the implementation and application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair commercial practices, SEC (2009) 1666, 3 December 2009, 15 
and 16, clearly drawing inspiration from the Opinion of Advocate-General Trstenjak of 3 September 2009, 
Case C-304/08, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft 
mbH, [2010] ECR I-217, para. 66 and from her Opinion of 24 March 2010, Case C-540/08, Mediaprint 
Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG v ‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag GmbH, [2010] ECR 
I-10909, paras. 55-58.
35 Case C-288/10, Wamo BVBA v JBC NV and Modemakers Fashion NV, nyr, para. 20; Case C-126/11, 
INNO NV v Unie van Zelfstandige Ondernemers VZW (UNIZO), Organisatie voor de Zelfstandige 
Modedetailhandel VZW (Mode Unie), Couture Albert BVBA, nyr, para. 22. See also J. Vannerom, ‘Case 
Wamo: And the Question Remains … Who Is (Actually) Protected?’, 2012 REDC 151; B. Akkermans, 
‘Belgian Prohibition on Sales Periods Outside the Legally Mentioned Periods’, 18 MJ 411, at 411-413 
(2011).
36 Commission Staff Working Document, Guidance on the implementation/application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, SEC (2009) 1666, 3 December 2009, 14.
37 See e.g. President of the Liège Commercial Court 17 July 2008, Jb.Hand.Med. at 250 (2008).
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economic interests of consumers. However, this argument is not very convincing,38 as 
there are no indications that in 2010 the Belgian legislator has renounced the consumer 
protection objectives when deciding to retake the prohibition. In this respect, it is worth 
noting that the preliminary question by the Belgian commercial court in the Euronics 
Belgium case explicitly states that ‘Article 101 [of the Market Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act] …, inter alia, is intended to protect the interests of consumers’. Even 
if the Belgian prohibition of sales below cost was introduced first and foremost with a 
view to protect the economic interests of small retailers, it falls within the scope of the 
Directive, as it does not exclusively seek to protect those interests.39
 Hence, national prohibitions of business-to-consumer sales below cost fall within the 
scope of the Directive, insofar as they pursue objectives related to consumer protection 
and do not exclusively seek to protect other (economic) interests.40 The inevitable 
conclusion is that the UCP Directive precludes the Belgian prohibition of sales below 
cost,41 just like it precludes the Belgian prohibition of discounts preceding seasonal 
sales.42
 It is worth noting that not all national prohibitions of sales below cost may fall outside 
the scope of the Directive. For each and every national prohibition of sales below cost 
one should examine whether the national protective purpose of the measure includes 
consumer protection or not. This means that similar prohibitions may fall outside the 
scope of the Directive in one Member State and inside the scope of the Directive in 
another. Thus, it may seem a mission impossible to autonomously define the (pre-
emptive) scope of the Directive, not only in relation to national prohibitions of sales 
below cost, but also in relation to, e.g., national prohibitions of discounts preceding 
seasonal sales.43
38 Compare Brussels Court of Appeal 17 January 2012, not publ., arguing that prohibition of discounts 
preceding seasonal sales was maintained in Article 32 of the 2010 Market Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act with the double aim of consumer protection and competitor protection, which inspired the 
introduction of that prohibition in 1985 in Article 53 of the Commercial Practices and Consumer Protection 
Act.
39 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van Koophandel te Gent (Belgium) lodged 
on 19 July 2012, Euronics Belgium CVBA v Kamera Express BV & Kamera Express Belgium BVBA, 
Case C-343/12. See similarly, as regards the compatibility of Austrian rules concerning liquidation sales, 
Opinion of Advocate-General Trstenjak of 6 September 2012, Case C-206/11, Georg Köck / Schutzverband 
gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb, nyr, paras. 37-39.
40 See also B. Keirsbilck and J. Stuyck, ‘Een kritische analyse van de Wet Marktpraktijken en 
Consumentenbescherming’, 116 TBH 739 (2010). Compare Gol, above n. 33, at 102 and 104; A. Puttemans 
and R. Gyory, ‘Qu’y a-t-il de neuf dans la nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du marché et la protection du 
consommateur (ex-LPCC) et qu’en est-il de sa compatibilité avec le droit européen?’, 2010 BFR 3, at 29.
41 See also Keirsbilck and Stuyck, above n. 40; Dewulf, Keirsbilck and Terryn, above n. 32, at 1117-1123.
42 Interestingly, the national courts which made the reference for a preliminary ruling in the Wamo and 
Inno cases, ruled subsequently that the Belgian prohibition of announcements of discount preceding 
seasonal sales (Article 53 of the 1991 Commercial Practices and Consumer Protection Act) fall within 
the scope of Directive 2005/29, as this national measure pertains to a ‘commercial practice’ and pursues 
objectives relating to consumer protection and that this measure is incompatible with the Directive, as it 
prohibits a particular commercial practice per se notwithstanding that this practice is not referred to in the 
blacklist of the directive. See President of the Dendermonde Commercial Court 20 June 2012, not publ. 
Court Cassation 2 Nov. 2012, not publ. See also B. Keirsbilck, ‘Sperperiode is dood en moet dringend 
begraven worden’, De Juristenkrant, 27 June 2012. 
 See also Press release of the European Commission, Consumers: the European Commission asks 
Belgium and France to comply with EU rules on unfair practices, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-1096_en.htm. See also Action brought on 13 September 2012, European Commission / 
Belgium, case C-421/12.
43 See, however, the overall analysis in the Original Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council Regulation on Sales Promotions in the Internal Market, 2 October 2001, COM (2001) 546 final, 
at 16: ‘A few Member States ban discounts for a specified period prior to seasonal sales. Both consumer 
protection and the protection against unfair competition are invoked to justify these bans. These bans are 
held to allow consumers to distinguish clearly between the pre-sales period (with no advertised discounts) 
and the seasonal sales periods (with considerable discounts). However, … they are counterproductive to 
protecting their invoked public interest objectives and should be replaced by clear transparency provisions 
on discounts.’ See Article 3(1) Original and Amended Commission Proposal: ‘Member States or non-public 
regulatory bodies shall not impose: – a prohibition on discounts preceding seasonal sales.’
264 Bert KeirsBilcK 
Step 2 – sales below cost have not been prohibited per se by the UCP Directive 
As selling below cost does not appear in Annex I to the UCP Directive, it cannot 
be prohibited in all circumstances, but can be prohibited only following a specific 
assessment allowing the unfairness of those practices to be established.44 In the light of 
the content and the general scheme of the provisions of the Directive, the UCP Directive 
precludes any national provision which establishes a presumption of unlawfulness of 
sales below cost and prohibits, generally and pre-emptively, sales below cost, without 
any verification of their unlawfulness in the light of the criteria laid down in Articles 5 
to 9.
 Besides, the Directive provides for adequate and sufficient consumer protection 
against bait advertising. In addition, competition law provides for adequate and sufficient 
protection against predatory pricing.45
 Hence, national consumer protection rules prohibiting business-to-consumer sales 
below cost are contrary to the Directive, in so far as they generally outlaw sales below 
cost, whereas the Directive does not blacklist such sales practices.
Conclusion – Yes, insofar as 
Hence, the answer of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive is yes; EU law precludes 
national prohibitions of sales below cost insofar as the particular national prohibition 
pursues objectives related to consumer protection. 
 Strangely enough, the positive integration wave of the UCP Directive goes further 
than the negative integration wave of Keck and Mithouard: the UCP Directive precludes 
certain national rules relating to selling arrangements for goods (commercial practices), 
where they do not exclusively seek to protect the economic interests of competitors; yet, 
under the Keck conditions, they used to fall outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU. The 
presumption of the Directive is the opposite to that in Keck: illegality of national rules 
restricting or prohibiting certain commercial practices and a presumption in favour of 
free trade.46 
3.2 Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003: No
Introduction
Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is also known as the Modernisation Regulation.47 
Convergence rule
Article 3(2), first sentence, Regulation 1/2003 states,
44 Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV and Galatea BVBA v 
Sanoma Magazines Belgium NV, [2009] ECR I-2949, paras. 53 et seq.; Case C-304/08, Zentrale zur 
Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH, [2010] ECR I-217, paras. 
42 et seq.; Case C-540/08, Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG v ‘Österreich’-
Zeitungsverlag GmbH, [2010] ECR 2010, I-10909, paras. 31 et seq.; Case C-288/10, Wamo BVBA v JBC 
NV and Modemakers Fashion NV, nyr, paras. 34 et seq.
45 See Keirsbilck and Stuyck, above n. 40.
46 See also G. Davies, ‘Can Selling Arrangements Be Harmonised?’, 30 European Law Review 370, at 
371 (2005); A. Pliakos and G. Anagnostaras, ‘Harmonising National Laws on Commercial Practices: Sales 
Promotions and the Impact on Business-to-Business Relations’, 35 European Law Review 425, at 429-430 
(2010); G. Anagnostaras, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in Perspective: from Legal Disparity 
to Legal Complexity?’, 47 CML Rev 147, at 156 (2010); Keirsbilck, above n. 23, at 232; C. Barnard, ‘What 
the Keck? Balancing the Needs of the Single Market with State Regulatory Autonomy in the EU (and the 
US)’, 2012 REDC 2; P. Oliver, ‘The Scope of Article 34 TFEU after Trailers’, 2012 REDC 313.
47 Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1/1.
 Does eU economic law PreclUDe national ProhiBitions of sales Below cost? 265
The application of national competition law may not lead to the prohibition of 
agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States but which do not restrict 
competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty, or which 
fulfil the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty or which are covered by a 
Regulation for the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. …48
This ‘convergence rule’ means that the application of national competition laws to 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices may not lead to the prohibition of such 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices if they are not also prohibited under 
Article 101 TFEU. Application of Article 101 TFEU to a particular case precludes 
inconsistent application of national competition law to that case. Stricter national 
competition laws can be applied only to local or regional cases which do not affect trade 
between Member States.49 The convergence rule seeks to create a level-playing field by 
providing for a single standard of assessment which allows undertakings to design EU-
wide business strategies without having to check them against all the relevant national 
sets of competition rules. It is a directly applicable rule that can be relied on before 
national courts, which implies that any measure adopted in breach of that rule would be 
inapplicable and unenforceable.50
 In its current wording, the obligation of convergence covers only the application 
of national competition law to agreements, concerted practices and decisions by 
associations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. Member States 
remain free to adopt or maintain stricter national competition laws than Article 102 
TFEU in order to prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct.51 Article 3(2), second sentence, 
Regulation 1/2003 states,
Member States shall not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting 
and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or 
sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.52
This exception from the level-playing field implies that undertakings doing cross-
border business in the internal market may be subjected to a variety of standards as 
to their unilateral behavior. According to the Commission, ‘the prohibition rule of 
Article [102], in so far as it applies to unilateral conduct, constitutes only a minimum 
standard that must be applied throughout the Community’.53 The Commission identified 
certain categories of national provisions of the type referred to in Article 3(2), second 
sentence, including national prohibitions of ‘resale below cost’ or ‘resale at loss’, 
typically based on a similar economic rationale as the prohibition of predatory pricing 
(abuse of dominance) but not requiring proof of dominance.54 A study commissioned 
by the European Commission is in the pipeline (COMP/2009/A4/021). This study will 
inter alia (i) provide an exhaustive overview of stricter national provisions on unilateral 
conduct in the 27 Member States, based on an assessment of the aim and the contents 
of the national provisions and, therefore, being independent of whether these provision 
are included in national competition laws and (ii) give a clear explanation of the impact 
which stricter national competition law provisions on unilateral conduct have on 
undertakings.
No
For the time being, the answer of the Modernisation Regulation is no; EU law does not 
preclude national prohibitions of sales below cost.
48 See also Recital 8 Regulation 1/2003.
49 Communication Report of 29 April 2009 on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final, 6.
50 Commission Staff Working Paper of 29 April 2009 accompanying the Report on Regulation 1/2003, 
(SEC (2009) 574 final, at 48-49.
51 Report on Regulation 1/2003, 6.
52 See also Recital 8 Regulation 1/2003.
53 Staff Working Paper on Article 3 Proposal 1/2003, 19.
54 Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report on Regulation 1/2003, 52-53.
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4 Epilogue: Should EU Economic Law Preclude National Prohibitions of 
Sales Below Cost?
Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003
In the 2009 Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission stated that 
the exclusion of unilateral conduct from the scope of the convergence rule is a matter 
which should be further examined.55 The divergence of standards regarding unilateral 
conduct has been criticised by the business and legal communities, considering that 
diverging standards fragment business strategies that are typically formulated on a pan-
European or global basis.56 The Commission also stated that such per se prohibitions may 
result in price increases and loss of consumer welfare.57 In my view, the Commission 
should consider to extend the convergence rule to national laws covering unilateral 
conduct.58 National prohibitions of resale below cost would then be precluded by EU 
competition law.
Report on the transposition and application of Directive 2005/29/EC
The Commission is expected to publish a Report on the application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices in the near future. One of the question 
of the Commission’s Consultation paper was ‘11. Do you consider that there are any 
legislative gaps in certain areas (e.g. sales promotions) which have affected the effective 
enforcement against certain unfair commercial practices? Should specific commercial 
practices be excluded from the scope of the Directive?’ In my view, the European 
legislator should consider to extend the scope of application of the Directive to cover, 
in principle, all commercial practices, whether B2C or B2B, irrespective of the national 
legislative aim of rules concerning commercial practices. This could be combined with 
some specific derogations such as in relation to certain selling arrangements.59 The EU 
legislator could indeed consider to leave some kinds of commercial practices, such as 
sale below cost, outside the scope of the harmonised UCP rules, since Member States 
are far from reaching any consensus in the regulation of such practices and since such 
practices – at least in the retail sector – have no or very limited cross-border dimension.60 
In this way, positive and negative harmonization would be again identical in scope and 
would constitute a reflection of each other. The unlikely and undesirable alternative 
would be to blacklist sale below cost.
55 Report on Regulation 1/2003, 6-7.
56 See also E. Morgan De Rivery and F. Amato, ‘The System of Interplay between EC and National Laws 
as Laid Down in Article 3’, in M. Merola and D. Waelbroeck (eds.), Towards an Optimal Enforcement of 
Competition Law in Europe (2010) 131, at 143.
57 Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report on Regulation 1/2003, 54-55, referring to inter alia U.K. 
Office of Fair Trading, ‘Supermarkets: The Code of Practice and Other Competition Issues, Conclusions’ 
(August 2005); OECD Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws and Regulations, Note by the Secretariat, 
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, 22 September 2005.
58 The above-mentioned study on the impact of national rules on unilateral conduct that diverge from 
Article 102 TFEU will also give an explanation and quantification of the impact of a possible extension of 
the convergence rule to national competition laws concerning unilateral conduct on undertakings.
59 See Keirsbilck, above n. 23.
60 See Written parliamentary question by E. Turunen, MEP (Verts/ALE) to the Commission, 2 July 2010, 
E-4844/10, whether the Commission intends to revise the UCP Directive with a view to allowing Member 
States to maintain or introduce national rules in those areas which were included in the SP Proposal so that 
consumers are ensured with a high level of protection and Answer given by V. Reding on behalf of the 
Commission, 9 August 2010, E-4844/2010; Written parliamentary question by E. Turunen, MEP (Verts/
ALE) to the Commission, 4 October 2010, E-7909/10 and Answer given by V. Reding on behalf of the 
Commission, 25 November 2010, E-7909/2010; Written parliamentary question by C. Schaldemose, MEP 
(S&D) to the Commission, 7 December 2010, E-010017/2010 and Answer given by V. Reding on behalf of 
the Commission, 2 February 2011, E-010017/2010.
